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In recent years, courts have entertained an increasing number of
claims contesting the appropriation of names, likenesses and per-
sonalities.1 Initially, a strong judicial impulse favored recognizing
the pecuniary value of names and personal features as protectable
interests under the right of privacy.2 Although most claimants in
fact alleged invasion of the right of privacy, various other theories
of recovery have been advanced, including misappropriation,3 un-
fair competition,4 and contract.5 The stark dissimilarities among
* J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1986; B. Mus. Educ., University of Massachu-
setts-Amherst, 1980. Before joining Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, the author
clerked for the Honorable Oscar H. Davis of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.
1. See, e.g., Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1054 (1985) (plaintiff relied on the common law right of publicity and the right of
privacy to bring suit against defendant for falsely identifying her in nude photographs);
Acme Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1983) (right of publicity
suit brought against defendant for its use of plaintiff's deceased husband's name in connec-
tion with its business); Cher v. Forum Int'l Ltd., 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1120 (1983) (court found that defendant violated plaintiff's right of publicity by
falsely indicating that she endorsed the magazine); Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F.
Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (plaintiff sued defendant for use of look-alike in advertisement);
Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, 122 Misc. 2d 603, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1984), aff'd, 110
A.D.2d 1095, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1985) (mere.); J.T. McCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICrrY
ND PRIVACY (1987); Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the Merchan-
dising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C.L. Rnv. 603 (1984); Nimmer, The Right of Public-
ity, 19 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRGBs. 203 (1954); Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First
Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 Tu. L. REv. 836
(1983).
2. See Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw.
UL. REv. 553 (1960).
3. E.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
4. E.g., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970); Lahr v.
Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962).
5. E.g., Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 64 F. 280 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894). See Nimmer, supra
note 1, at 214. For a thorough evaluation of the inadequacies of these theories, see generally
Nimmer, supra note 1, at 204-15.
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these causes of action contributed to judicial confusion and ulti-
mately led to inconsistent decisions.'
Gradually, courts began deciding cases involving the commercial
exploitation of names and likenesses under the evolving common
law right of publicity. Of relatively recent origin,7 the right of pub-
licity injected into the law a uniformity that has been more appar-
ent than real. Although the publicity right has won increased judi-
cial acceptance during the past twenty years, courts have struggled
to find suitable legal analogies on which to base their decisions.
Whether a court views the right of publicity as a privacy right,
property right, or a species of copyright, therefore, has conse-
quences that are outcome determinative.
This Article identifies four different types of claims that are ac-
tionable under the right of publicity and argues that first amend-
ment conflicts vary depending on the specific type of claim as-
serted. The Article suggests that the copyright law provides a
suitable model for right of publicity decisions. By applying a modi-
fied fair use doctrine to certain right of publicity cases, courts can
more effectively balance first amendment free speech interests and
the twin policies underlying the right of publicity: promoting crea-
tivity and preventing unjust enrichment.
II. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Broadly defined, the right of publicity is the right to own, pro-
tect, and profit from the commercial value of an individual's name,
likeness, activities, or identity." Neither enshrined in the Constitu-
tion nor enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the right of publicity has
its antecedents in the right of privacy.
In an 1890 law review article, Samuel Warren and Louis Bran-
deis identified a common law right of privacy and described the
6. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 554; see also Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444
F. Supp. 279, 282-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (acknowledging that many courts address the right of
publicity under the guise of a right of privacy).
7. See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953) (recognizing a common law right of publicity in photo-
graphs of famous baseball players).
8. See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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injury involved as a violation of a person's right "to be let alone."9
Warren and Brandeis asserted, however, that people lose their
rights to privacy in things they make public.10 Under the original
formulation of the right of privacy, therefore, performers could
have no privacy interest in their names and likenesses. Thus, any
privacy justification for a right of publicity is likely to be consid-
ered weak.
Eventually, Dean Prosser suggested a more detailed definition of
exactly what the right of privacy includes. In his noted treatise on
tort law, Prosser stated that "the law of privacy comprises four
distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff,
which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have
almost nothing in common except that each represents an interfer-
ence with the right of the plaintiff 'to be let alone.' "" Specifically,
Prosser's four invasions are: the intrusion upon physical solitude,
the public disclosure of private facts, publicity that places someone
in a false light, and the appropriation of one's name or likeness for
another's benefit. 2
In recent years, Prosser's fourth invasion, appropriation of plain-
tiff's name or likeness for defendant's benefit, has acquired the la-
bel "right of publicity."'3 Courts and commentators have sup-
ported recognition of a right of publicity independent of Prosser's
fourth category, however, to avoid the inherent contradiction of
classifying a commercial right under the heading of "privacy."' 4
This appears to make perfect sense when one carefully considers
Prosser's four categories. With respect to the first three invasions,
the injured party attempts to protect his interest by minimizing
the intrusion or publication of the damaging matter. In contrast,
the right of publicity plaintiff does not necessarily object to the
9. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 205 (1890). For an
argument that in the process of searching for the right of privacy in the common law, War-
ren and Brandeis actually invented the right, see Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and
the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1581 (1979).
10. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 9, at 215.
11. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 804 (4th ed. 1971).
12. Id. at 804-14.
13. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 908 (1979).
14. See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 9, at 1588-89. This contradiction was also apparent
to Warren and Brandeis. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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commercial exploitation, provided the exploitation is at his behest
and the profits accrue to his benefit.15
In 1953, the right of publicity first received judicial recognition
as a right distinct from the right of privacy.16 In Haelan Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,7 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit expressly recognized the right of
publicity as an independent, enforceable property right.', Because
Haelan Laboratories remains the seminal case in the development
of the right of publicity, it is useful to examine the decision in
some detail. Haelan Laboratories involved a baseball player who
executed a contract granting to plaintiff the exclusive right to use
the player's name and photograph in promoting sales of plaintiff's
chewing gum. The defendant, a competitor, secured the same
player's authorization to use his name and photograph to advertise
and sell its own gum. The court stated that such behavior, if delib-
erate, would be tortious.'9 The defendant contended that an indi-
vidual had no legal right to control the publication of his name and
picture apart from his right of privacy. According to the defendant,
the contract between the plaintiff and the player was merely a re-
lease from potential liability for invasion of privacy rather than a
transfer of exclusive rights.2"
Although Judge Frank agreed that under the existing right of
privacy doctrine, the exclusive-use contract released the plaintiff
but did not constitute an assignment,2 his analysis did not end
there. Instead, the opinion proceeded to recognize a separate right,
using the following widely quoted language:
We think that, in addition to and independent of [the] right
of privacy ... a man has a right in the publicity value of his
photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of
publishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly be
made "in gross," i.e., without an accompanying transfer ... of
anything else. Whether it be labelled a "property" right is im-
15. See Factors Etc., Inc., 579 F.2d at 220.
16. See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 221-22.
17. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
18. Id. at 868.
19. Id. at 867-68.
20. Id. at 867.
21. Id.
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RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CASES
material; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag "property" simply
symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecu-
niary worth.
This right might be called a "right of publicity." ... This
right of publicity would usually yield . . . no money unless it
could be made the subject of an exclusive grant. 22
The court implicitly distinguished the right of privacy when it
proclaimed that "it is common knowledge that many prominent
persons.. ., far from having their feelings bruised through public
exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no
longer received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing
their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, buses,
trains and subways. '2 3
If, as Roscoe Pound claimed, the Brandeis-Warren law review
article did "nothing less than add a chapter to our law, '24 subse-
quent scholarship by Professor Nimmer should be credited with
adding an additional paragraph or two. In his 1954 piece entitled
The Right of Publicity, Professor Nimmer reaffirmed the Second
Circuit's conclusion that the right of publicity exists independent
of the right of privacy.2 5 Nimmer demonstrated that alternative
theories such as pure privacy, unfair competition, contract and
defamation were inadequate to protect the interest in name and
likeness.2" Further, he identified four basic theoretical differences
between the right of publicity and its antecedents in the right of
privacy.
First, Nimmer argued that the right of publicity should be con-
ceptualized as a proprietary and not a personal interest. Second, he
contended that damages should not be measured by injury sus-
tained to plaintiff's psyche, but rather should be evaluated accord-
ing to the value of the publicity. Third, although inanimate ob-
jects, animals, and institutions enjoy no right of privacy, Nimmer
suggested that their human owners should have a right of publicity
in such property. Finally, Nimmer maintained that unlike pure
22. Id. at 868 (emphasis added).
23. Id.
24. A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LiFz 70 (1946) (quoting Dean Roscoe Pound's
communication. to William Chilton, 1916).
25. Nimmer, supra note 1, at 223.
26. Id. at 204-15.
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privacy actions, right of publicity actions should not include the
defense of waiver against celebrity plaintiffs because of their fame,
because that fame is the very factor that triggers a substantial
publicity value.2"
Following the appearance of Professor Nimmer's article, claim-
ants attempted to secure protection for personality elements other
than name and likeness. Attributes sought to be protected in-
cluded a particular routine or act,28 unique style, 9 characters cre-
ated by the celebrity,30 characters made famous by the celebrity,3 1
and biographical information.2 Although these efforts met with
varying degrees of success, the courts' approaches, at least, have
been uniform. In deciding whether the right of publicity applies to
a particular attribute, courts consider the policies underlying the
right of publicity.3
Courts consistently have identified two goals served by the rec-
ognition of a right of publicity: the promotion of creative endeavor,
and the prevention of unjust enrichment.34 Moreover, courts deter-
mine the scope of publicity rights by balancing these policies
against countervailing first amendment and free trade interests. 5
Protecting the right of publicity provides incentive for perform-
ers to make the economic investments required to produce per-
formances that appeal to the public. The underlying assumption is
that the greater the possibility for personal profit, the more likely
people are to pursue creative activities. As one court delicately put
it:
27. Id. at 216.
28. E.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (human can-
nonball act).
29. E.g., Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962) (imitation of Bert Lahr's
voice and comic delivery style).
30. E.g., Price v. Hal Roach Studios, 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (comic characters
developed by Stan Laurel and Oliver Hardy).
31. E.g., Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323
(1979) (Bela Lugosi's portrayal of Count Dracula).
32. E.g., Rosemont Enter. v. Urban Sys., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct.
1973) (biographical facts about Howard Hughes).
33. E.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575-77 (1977).
34. A third goal, protecting privacy interests of celebrities, has been discredited, largely
under a waiver rationale. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
35. See infra pt. IIH.
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Although fame and stardom may be ends in themselves, they are
normally by-products of one's activities and personal attributes,
as well as luck and promotion. The basic motivations are the
desire to achieve success or excellence in a chosen field, the de-
sire to contribute to the happiness or improvement of one's fel-
lows and the desire to receive the psychic and financial rewards
of achievement."6
Further, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
rewarding successful entertainers for their efforts and thereby en-
couraging artists to devote their lives to creative endeavor is in the
public interest.3 7 Obviously, granting a celebrity a right of publicity
in any aspect of his personality increases the value of stardom,
thus making creative endeavors more attractive. As the value of
fame increases, however, misappropriation becomes more lucrative
and the need to protect against unjust enrichment becomes more
important.
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co." is the only right
of publicity case decided by the Supreme Court to date. Hugo
Zacchini, a human cannonball, brought suit against Scripps-How-
ard for unlawfully appropriating his professional property. 9 With-
out Zacchini's permission, Scripps-Howard had filmed his perform-
ance at an Ohio county fair and broadcast fifteen seconds of the
film on its evening news program.40 The Court's analysis began
with a review of cases granting performers the right to sue for mis-
appropriation of their performances.41 The issues in Zacchini were
drawn clearly. If Scripps-Howard was permitted to film and broad-
cast the cannonball act without compensating Zacchini, it would
benefit from the act at no cost beyond its relatively insignificant
production expenses. Conversely, granting Zacchini a right to con-
trol the dissemination of his performance not only would enable
him to secure compensation for the benefit his performance be-
stowed on others, but also would operate to prevent others from
36. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir. 1980).
37. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576-77.
38. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
39. Id. at 563-64.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 572 n.9.
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benefiting from unjust enrichment.42 Because celebrities often in-
vest substantial time and money to achieve uncertain success, fair-
ness would seem to dictate that they be entitled to whatever value
derives from their efforts.
Although promoting creative endeavor and preventing unjust en-
richment often operate as powerful incentives toward recognition
of the right of publicity, they nonetheless must be considered in
conjunction with the countervailing first amendment policies
favoring free speech and free trade. In the next section, this Article
examines potential conflicts between the right of publicity and the
first amendment.
III. ACCOMMODATING COMPETING PUBLICITY RIGHTS AND FIRST
AMENDMENT INTERESTS
Before exploring the tension between the right of publicity and
the first amendment, certain broad and potentially conflicting
principles of general application should be noted. The first amend-
ment provides, in pertinent part, "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."43 In a 1969 deci-
sion involving important first amendment issues, the Supreme
Court embraced "the right of the public to receive suitable access
to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and exper-
iences. '' 44 Consequently, freedom of speech embraces two comple-
mentary and correlative components: a right to communicate infor-
mation and a right to receive communications.
The Supreme Court has held that entertainment, as well as
news, enjoys first amendment protection. 45 Entertainment, how-
ever, frequently is a commercial enterprise conducted for personal
profit. If entertainment is properly regarded as a form of commer-
cial speech, it will receive only minimal first amendment protec-
tion.4 e In addition, to the extent that entertainers are classifiable
as public figures, their privacy interests may merit less first
42. The Court appeared to allude to the unjust enrichment rationale. See id. at 576.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
44. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
45. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 578.
46. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) (holding that commercial speech will receive minimal first amend-
ment protection because it is not entirely outside the protection of the first amendment).
[Vol. 29:781
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amendment protection than the privacy interests of private
citizens.47
A celebrity's attributes can be exploited in several ways. His pic-
ture can be placed on commercial products,48 his name or likeness
can be included in a product or service advertisement,4 9 books and
movies can be created based on the celebrity's life or experiences,"
or the celebrity's act can become the subject of a news broadcast. 1
In general, the more the exploitation involves purely commercial
appropriation, the greater the likelihood of actionability. However,
some exploitative uses implicate important first amendment inter-
ests that may defeat an otherwise legitimate claim of infringement.
In Zacchini, the Supreme Court examined the first amendment
limits on the right of entertainers to control public dissemination
of their performances.5 2 In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled in favor
of Zacchini and held that the first amendment did not give
Scripps-Howard the right to appropriate Zacchini's "entire act." 3
The Court overturned the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling that al-
though Zacchini might have an action against ordinary infringers
for appropriation of his "likeness and identity," the press had a
first amendment privilege to make such an appropriation."
Writing for the majority, Justice White noted that state-created
rights of performance were a valid and desirable means of provid-
ing entertainers with an economic incentive to continue perform-
ing. 55 Although he acknowledged that entertainment could be legit-
imate news to which the public had a first amendment right of
47. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (public figures are persons
who, because of the notoriety of their accomplishments or their ability to gain the attention
of the public, have become prominent in society).
48. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978) (Elvis Presley posters),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
49. Carson v. National Bank of Commerce Trust & Sav., 501 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1974)
(Carson's name used to promote Las Vegas trip).
50. Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (fictionalization of
event in the life of Agatha Christie).
51. Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562 (human cannonball act filmed and broadcast on evening news).
52. Id. at 565. For a discussion of the facts of Zacchini, see supra notes 40-42 and accom-
panying text.
53. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574-75.
54. 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 231, 234-36, 351 N.E.2d 454, 459, 461-62 (1976), rev'd, 433 U.S.
562 (1977).
55. 433 U.S. at 576.
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access, Justice White insisted that state rights of performance did
not prevent the press from reporting to the public such news-
worthy information. 6
The conflict confronting the Court in Zacchini should be appar-
ent. On one hand, Zacchini's human cannonball act was an attri-
bute clearly protected by the right of publicity. On the other hand,
the exploitative use of Zacchini's act, dissemination via an evening
news broadcast, warranted first amendment consideration." Ulti-
mately, the Court concluded that the news broadcast exceeded the
bounds of the first amendment because it appropriated Zacchini's
"entire act."58
Crucial to the Court's decision was the fact that by appropriat-
ing Zacchini's entire act, the defendant had jeopardized the celeb-
rity's ability to earn a living. 9 Moreover, both policy rationales
favoring the right of publicity operated strongly in Zacchini's
favor. First, by denying the press the right to rebroadcast
Zacchini's entire act, the Court protected Zacchini's "drawing
power" and thus nurtured his incentive to perform. Second, the
decision effectively prevented Scripps-Howard from reaping the
fruits of Zacchini's labors. Implicit in the Court's decision is the
suggestion that to the extent the right of publicity does not with-
hold the material in question from the public, but only determines
who will benefit from its dissemination, potential conflict with the
first amendment is minimized.
More recently, two federal district courts have addressed the
conflict between the right of publicity and the first amendment.
Estate of Presley v. Russen0 involved "The Big El Show," a stage
production patterned after an Elvis Presley concert. A Presley imi-
tator mimicked Presley's voice, appearance, and unique singing
style. Presley's estate sought to restrain all use of the name "The
Big El Show," "the image or likeness or persona of Elvis Presley,"
and any of the various names by which Presley is popularly known,
"on any goods, in any promotional materials, in any advertising or
in connection with the offering or rendering of any musical ser-
56. Id. at 574.
57. Id. at 578.
58. Id. at 575.
59. Id. at 575-76.
60. 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1348 (D.N.J. 1981).
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vices."6 1 The case presented a novel issue; namely, how the right of
publicity applied to a stage production that imitated a deceased
celebrity's performance. 62 The United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey examined three distinct right of publicity
issues: whether New Jersey recognized the common law right of
publicity, whether the right descended to the estate upon the
death of the individual, and whether "The Big El Show" infringed
on plaintiff's publicity rights.63
The court first found that New Jersey recognized the right of
publicity.6 4 Because the court considered the publicity right to be a
property interest, it held that the right descended upon the death
of its creator.6 5 Finally, the court addressed whether first amend-
ment considerations would defeat plaintiff's infringement claim.
The court's first amendment analysis focused on whether "The
Big El Show" "serve[d] a social function valued by the protection
of free speech."66 Typically, a defendant's exploitative use of a ce-
lebrity's personality will inform, entertain, or sell a product. When
an exploitative use disseminates information or "contributes to so-
ciety's cultural enrichment," however, it is worthy of first amend-
ment protection sufficient to defeat a plaintiff's infringement
claim.617 Conversely, if an exploitive use is purely commercial, first
amendment considerations are less significant and the plaintiff's
infringement claim probably will succeed.6 8 Within this framework,
the court attempted to characterize the purpose of "The Big El
Show."
Although the court found that "The Big El Show" contained
both informational and entertainment elements, it determined that
the show's predominant design was to "commercially exploit the
likeness of Elvis Presley without contributing anything of substan-
tial value to society."69 The court distinguished cases granting first
61. Id. at 1344.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1353-54.
64. Id. at 1354.
65. Id. at 1355.
66. Id. at 1356.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1359.
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amendment protection to entertainment because "The Big El
Show" lacked its "own creative component" and therefore did not
have a "significant value as pure entertainment."70 The court also
took pains to note the production's limited informational value,
particularly when compared to a biographical work about Presley
or a discourse on Presley's contribution to popular music.71 Finally,
the court was struck by the similarity between the wholesale ap-
propriation of a complete Presley concert-the very activity by
which Presley initially acquired his reputation-and the news
broadcast of Zacchini's entire act.72 The court therefore held that
"The Big El Show" did not merit sufficient first amendment pro-
tection to defeat plaintiff's publicity infringement claim.73
Similarly, Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night Co.7 4
raised first amendment issues in the right of publicity context.
Groucho Marx Productions involved a Broadway musical during
which performers imitated the unique appearance, style, and man-
nerisms of the Marx brothers. Plaintiffs alleged that the perform-
ance infringed publicity rights created by the deceased comedi-
ans. 5 As in Russen, the issues facing the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York included the exis-
tence and devisability of the right, in addition to first amendment
concerns.7" As a preliminary matter, the court held that New York
recognized publicity rights in the commercial value in a name and
likeness.7 The devisability question turned on whether the broth-
ers had exploited their respective publicity rights during their
lives, and the court found that all brothers had preserved their
rights through lifetime exercise.7 8
70. Id. The court was also careful to distinguish parody and satire, both of which would
be protected speech, from the blatant parroting at issue in Russen. Id. at 1359 n.21.
71. Id. at 1360.
72. Id. at 1360-61.
73. Id. at 1361. Nonetheless, apparently influenced by first amendment concerns, the
court refused to enjoin production of the show, primarily because plaintiff failed to demon-
strate irreparable harm. Id. at 1378-79.
74. 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
75. Id. at 486.
76. Id. at 487.
77. Id. at 489.
78. Id. at 489-92.
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Having thus disposed of the two preliminary issues, the court
turned its attention to whether the first amendment protected de-
fendant's appropriation. The court began its analysis by noting
that the first amendment protected entertainment.7 9 The court
stressed, however, that "the purpose or function of such entertain-
ment must be scrutinized in determining the scope of the right of
publicity."80 Further, the court held that commercial uses of a ce-
lebrity's persona were actionable, but that informative or enter-
taining uses were protected by the first amendment.8 1 The court
acknowledged that "parody, burlesque, satire and critical review
might be immune from the right of publicity because of their con-
tribution as entertainment and as a form of literary criticism." 2
At the parties' request, the judge reviewed the play. According
to the opinion, any literary or entertainment value of the produc-
tion was "substantially overshadowed. . . by the wholesale appro-
priation of the Marx Brothers characters."' 3 Thus, the court held
that the particular production before it was not entitled to first
amendment protection because it lacked any creative component
that would give it societal value.8 4 As support for denying the first
amendment defense to plaintiffs' publicity right infringement
claim, the court relied on Russen and Zacchini.5
The first amendment defense is most powerful when asserted in
cases involving news and newsworthy figures. At a minimum, the
first amendment guarantees "the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint
or fear of subsequent punishment.""6 This guarantee is furthered
by protecting publication of newsworthy items from undue re-
straint. Obviously, a right of publicity that permits a celebrity to
either prevent or punish the dissemination of news violates both
the letter and the spirit of the first amendment.
79. Id. at 492.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 493.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 493-94.
86. First Natl Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (quoting Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940)).
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At times, the judicial resolution of first amendment issues has
produced inconsistent holdings. For example, Paulsen v. Personal-
ity Posters, Inc.87 illustrates the extent to which a court will strive
to protect the publication and distribution of what it deems to be
newsworthy matters. Paulsen, a well-known comedian, sued to pre-
vent the defendant from distributing a poster with his picture cap-
tioned "For President."88 Although the poster allegedly commemo-
rated Paulsen's candidacy in the 1968 presidential election, he
contended that the poster was an unauthorized appropriation of
his name and likeness. In addition, Paulsen argued that the poster
was commercial speech and therefore was unprotected by the first
amendment. 9 The Supreme Court of New York County disagreed,
holding that "[w]hen a well-known entertainer enters the presiden-
tial ring, tongue in cheek or otherwise, it is clearly newsworthy and
of public interest. . .[and] it is sufficiently relevant to a matter of
public interest to be a form of expression which is constitutionally
protected and 'deserving of substantial freedom.' "90 Further, even
though the poster was more entertaining than informative, this did
not alter its protected status. In the court's view, the right of pub-
licity was limited to advertising uses and had no application to
matters of public interest.9
Conversely, the court in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc." evi-
denced far less deference toward the first amendment. Two days
after the sudden death of Elvis Presley, his estate granted plaintiff
the exclusive license to exploit Presley's name and likeness com-
mercially. The following day, the defendant published and began
to market a poster bearing Presley's photograph and the caption
"In Memory. '93 When plaintiff succeeded in obtaining a prelimi-
nary injunction restraining defendant from infringing plaintiff's
exclusive license, defendant appealed.94
87. 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
88. Id. at 445, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
89. Id. at 447, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 505.
90. Id. at 449-50, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 507-08 (quoting Berlin v. E.C. Publications, 329 F.2d
541, 545, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964)).
91. Id. at 450-51, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 507-08.
92. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
93. Id. at 217.
94. Id. at 215.
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As a threshold matter, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit considered whether Presley's right of publicity
survived his death. 5 Because the court found that the exclusive
license constituted a valid, transferable property right, it con-
cluded that the right survived Presley's death.9 6 Next, the court
turned to defendant's contention that it enjoyed a privilege to
print and distribute its memorial poster of Presley because the
poster celebrated a newsworthy event.9 The court noted that de-
fendant's reliance on Paulsen was misplaced because, in that case,
"Paulsen's choice of the political arena for satire made him 'news-
worthy' in the First Amendment sense."98 Ultimately the court re-
fused to place the Presley memorial poster "in the same category
as one picturing a presidential candidate, albeit a mock candi-
date."'99 The court therefore held that defendant's poster was not
privileged as celebrating a newsworthy event."'
At first blush, the inconsistent holdings in Paulsen and Factors
Etc. appear to be reconcilable on content grounds. Simply stated,
political speech has always occupied a position of priority in the
spectrum of first amendment protection."' Because the allegedly
infringing article in Paulsen-a poster of a mock presidential can-
didate-arguably qualified as political speech, first amendment in-
terests were especially strong. In contrast, the memorial poster in
Factors Etc. had no political significance whatsoever, and first
amendment concerns therefore were properly subordinated to
Presley's right of publicity. However, before one embraces-the gen-
eralization that publicity rights necessarily wilt in the face of first
amendment protections surrounding political speech, a recent deci-
sion involving the publicity rights of the late Dr. Martin Luther
King merits examination.
95. Id. at 221.
96. Id.




101. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1964).
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In Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v.
American Heritage Products, Inc.,0 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia extended the scope of
publicity rights to include attributes of political figures. Several
years after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., de-
fendant began manufacturing and peddling plastic busts of the
slain civil rights leader.103 Dr. King's heirs, seeking to enjoin the
manufacture and sale of what they considered to be crass
memorabilia, brought suit alleging infringement of King's right of
publicity.104 Although Georgia law clearly recognized the right of
publicity, the extent of its application to political figures had never
been squarely resolved. The first issue facing the court was
whether King, a political figure, could properly assert a right of
publicity.10 5
The court rejected defendant's contention that by virtue of his
status as a popular figure, King somehow had waived his right of
publicity.1 6 Although the court acknowledged that as a general
matter, persons who seek public office relinquish some of the pro-
tection afforded by privacy and defamation law, the court distin-
guished publicity rights and refused to adopt defendant's waiver
theory. According to the court, "[a]ny waiver that may be implied
when a person seeks public acclaim applies essentially only to
newsworthy public comment or disclosures of legitimate public in-
terest.'07 Consequently, without explicitly addressing any first
amendment issues, the court held that King enjoyed a right of
publicity during his lifetime. 0
Having decided that notwithstanding their status as popular
figures, political figures could assert publicity rights, the court ad-
dressed the question of the descendibility of publicity rights. Even
though King was deemed to have enjoyed the right of publicity
during his lifetime, whether the right survived King's death was an
102. 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981), rev'd and remanded, 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir.
1983).
103. Id. at 856.
104. Id. at 859-62.
105. Id. at 862-63.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 863.
108. Id.
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issue of first impression facing the court.10 9 The court noted that
the majority of states recognizing the descendibility of publicity
rights did so only when the rights were actively exploited during
the lifetime of their creator.110 Because plaintiffs failed to demon-
strate that King had intended "to capitalize on the commercial
value of his name and likeness,""' they did not meet the require-
ment of exploitation during life, and the court concluded that
King's right of publicity did not descend to plaintiffs." 2 On appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit re-
versed this holding, stating that "a person who avoids exploitation
during life is entitled to have his image protected against exploita-
tion after death just as much if not more than a person who ex-
ploited his image during life.""' 3
IV. FOUR POTENTIAL INFRINGEMENTS OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
As noted above, the right of publicity embraces the right to own,
protect, and profit from the commercial value of an individual's
name, likeness, activities and identity." 4 The cases examined thus
far demonstrate that the publicity right may be infringed in a vari-
ety of ways. Review of the relevant case law suggests that right of
publicity actions generally involve at least one of four distinct in-
fringements: appropriation of plaintiff's name or likeness for ad-
vertising or endorsement purposes, appropriation of plaintiff's
name or likeness to promote the sale of memorabilia, appropriation
of plaintiff's unique style or characters which plaintiff has created
or made famous, or appropriation of plaintiff's performance. Al-
though certain publicity right decisions resist being pigeonholed
neatly into one specific category of infringement, this classification
system provides a useful analytical framework for evaluating judi-
cial decisions that purport to balance publicity rights against first
amendment concerns. As demonstrated below, this analysis under-
scores the existence of a sliding scale of first amendment protec-
109. Id.
110. Id. at 864.'
111. Id. at 865.
112. Id.
113. 694 F.2d 674, 683 (11th Cir. 1983).
114. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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tions in right of publicity actions. In particular, the nature of the
specific infringement alleged will significantly impact the weight
the court will ascribe to countervailing first amendment rights.
A. Appropriation of Name or Likeness for Advertising or En-
dorsement Purposes
Historically, right of publicity actions have been most successful
when the alleged infringement consists of the appropriation of
plaintiff's name or likeness to sell a product.115 Perhaps the most
egregious infringements involve unauthorized endorsements; that
is, use of a person's photograph or testimonial without his consent
to recommend a product.116 The underlying assumption of adver-
tisers seems to be that by invoking a well-known figure they can
establish the quality or glamour of their product. Decisions up-
holding publicity rights challenges to unauthorized endorsements
are consistent with well-established judicial precedent and public
policy. Courts traditionally have been reluctant to extend first
amendment protection to commercial speech. Although the Su-
preme Court has held that commercial speech is deserving of some
first amendment protection, 1 7 the amount of protection ultimately
granted consistently has fallen short of the level courts are willing
to afford political speech." 8 In general, commercial advertising
lacks the inherent values considered worthy of constitutional pro-
tection." 9 Notwithstanding a social policy encouraging commercial
enterprise and the free use of public information for commercial
gain, commercial speech therefore is not regarded as being of con-
stitutional proportions.
In addition, a strong public policy against fraudulent business
practices supports recovery for infringement of the publicity right
115. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 908 (1979); Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
116. See generally Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal
Histories, 51 TEx. L. REv. 637 (1973).
117. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 762 (1976).
118. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
119. See id.
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in unauthorized endorsement cases. 120 Typically, the person whose
name or likeness is appropriated suffers an identifiable economic
harm. The unauthorized commercial use creates a false impression
of a business relationship between the advertiser and the plaintiff
and deprives the latter of the advertiser's usual endorsement fee.
Further, the uncompensated use of plaintiff's endorsement of a
given product may destroy plaintiff's ability to procure paid en-
dorsement opportunities with competing manufacturers. Moreover,
each endorsement by plaintiff, whether compensated or not, di-
lutes the value of subsequent endorsements and may undermine
plaintiff's credibility. An unauthorized endorsement is also essen-
tially a false claim about a product and may mislead the public
while procuring an unfair trade advantage for the infringer. 2'
Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co.122 illustrates the economic detriment
caused by unauthorized endorsements as well as the limitations of
relying on privacy law for recovery. Ben Hogan, a well-known
golfer, brought suit when defendant used Hogan's name and pic-
ture on the jacket and in the text of a book in a manner that im-
plied Hogan's authorship of the book. The Pennsylvania Court of
Common Pleas held that because Hogan did not want his name
withheld from public scrutiny but wished to profit from the com-
mercial use of his identity, his claim did not properly sound in pri-
vacy. 2 The court nonetheless awarded Hogan $5000 and de-
scribed his injury as the misappropriation without his consent of
his property right in the commercial value of his name and photo-
graph.'24 This injury resulted, in turn, in unfair competition and
an invasion of Hogan's right of publicity.125
Two suits brought by popular talk show host Johnny Carson il-
lustrate the extent to which right of publicity protections are de-
120. For examples of federal statutes prohibiting fraudulent business practices, see 8
U.S.C. § 1005 (1988) (imposing criminal sanctions for any false entry in any book, report, or
statement of a bank); 15 U.S.C. § 1644 (imposing criminal sanctions for fraudulent use of a
credit card in interstate commerce).
121. Generally, suits of this type are also actionable under the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-77 (1982), which forbids deceptive trade practices and unfair
competition.
122. 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1957).
123. Id. at 316.
124. Id. at 321-22.
125. Id. at 318, 320.
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pendent on state law. In Carson v. National Bank of Commerce
Trust & Savings,26 Carson sought damages for the unauthorized
use of his name in an advertisement promoting a trip to Las Vegas.
A promotional brochure described the trip as the "Nebraskan's
Johnny Carson Tour of Las Vegas." Tickets to Carson's nightclub
show were included in the tour package but Carson was otherwise
unconnected with the travel venture.127 Because Nebraska law did
not recognize a right to control the use of one's own name and
image, Carson was unable to prevail under either a misappropria-
tion or a right of publicity theory.'28
Carson fared better in Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toi-
lets, Inc.2 9 Following a bench trial, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that Carson had
no claim against a toilet manufacturer's use of the phrase "Here's
Johnny" in conjunction with its product advertisements because
the phrase could not be construed as Carson's name or likeness. 30
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, how-
ever, vacated the judgment and flushed the case back to the dis-
trict court.' 13 Undeterred that Michigan law, which governed Car-
son's claims, had not yet clearly addressed the right of publicity,
the Sixth Circuit predicted that the Michigan courts would adopt
the right.3 2 Even though neither Carson's name nor his likeness
was used, the court held that appropriation of his "identity" in-
vaded his right of publicity.'
B. Appropriation of Plaintiff's Name or Likeness To Promote
the Sale of Memorabilia
Products displaying a celebrity's name or likeness can include
"plastic toy pencil sharpeners, plastic model figures, T-shirts and
sweat shirts, card games, soap and detergent products, picture puz-
zles, candy dispensers, masks, kites, belts and belt buckles, and
126. 501 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1974).
127. Id. at 1083.
128. Id. at 1084-86.
129. 498 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1980), vacated, 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
130. Id. at 77-78.
131. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
132. Id. at 834 n.1.
133. Id. at 836.
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beverage stirring rods."'1 4 Indeed, commercial uses of a celebrity's
persona in memorabilia appear to be limited only by the imagina-
tion of schlock peddlers and souvenir hawkers. Although much of
the preceding commercial speech analysis13 5 applies with equal
force to memorabilia, to the extent a product serves informative or
cultural functions, it will be accorded a social value that transcends
commercial enterprise. Generally speaking, however, memorabilia
derives its appeal almost entirely from the commercial potential of
a particular person's name or likeness and is thus by nature ex-
ploitative. For example, a T-shirt with a rock star's picture embla-
zoned across its front has little, if any, informative or cultural
value and consequently merits minimal first amendment protec-
tion. The success of the product is determined not by the strength
or content of its message, but rather by the popularity of the per-
son portrayed.
Right of publicity actions frequently are triggered by the unau-
thorized use of plaintiff's name or likeness to promote the sale of
memorabilia. Indeed, the first judicial decision to recognize the
right of publicity was brought by a chewing gum manufacturer and
involved the right to use a baseball player's picture on a bubble
gum card.138  Perhaps no single event has generated more
memorabilia, and consequently more right of publicity litigation,
than the untimely death of singer Elvis Presley.137 Following Pres-
ley's death on August 16, 1977, the market for Presley memorabilia
exploded as his grieving fans demanded posters, T-shirts, statu-
ettes, and other souvenirs bearing his name and likeness. Interest-
ingly, the October 10, 1977, cover story of People magazine ad-
dressed this phenomenon under the headline, "Remembering
134. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 829, 603 P.2d 425, 435, 160 Cal. Rptr.
323, 333 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
135. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
136. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 16-20 and accom-
panying text.
137. See, e.g., Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Tenn.
1977), rev'd, 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Factors Etc., Inc. v.
Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444
F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908
(1979).
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Elvis-Imitators, Fans and Rip-Offs Launch a Billion Dollar
Industry."'""
Earlier, this Article analyzed the inconsistent resolution of first
amendment issues in the context of the memorabilia cases involv-
ing Pat Paulsen,"3 9 Elvis Presley, 40 and Martin Luther King, Jr.'
To review, a poster of Paulsen sold during his tongue-in-cheek
1968 campaign for the presidency was held to be protected speech,
but a poster of Presley commemorating his death was held to be
unprotected speech. To complicate matters, a statuette of King
was held to be unprotected speech on the theory that politicians do
not waive their publicity rights merely by entering the political
arena.
On somewhat different grounds, the United States District Court
for the Western District of Tennessee in Memphis Development
Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc.42 held a statuette of Presley to be
unprotected speech. In that case, plaintiff commissioned a sculptor
to create a large bronze statue of Presley to be erected in down-
town Memphis. To finance the tribute, plaintiff solicited contribu-
tions. As an incentive to potential 'contributors, plaintiff offered
pewter replicas of the statue to donors who contributed $25.00 or
more. 143 Plaintiff sued to enjoin the assignees of Presley's right of
publicity from interfering with the advertisement and promotion
of the statue.'4 Although the court allowed the plaintiff to build
its memorial, it prohibited the manufacture, distribution, and sale
of the statuettes. 145 Unfortunately, the opinion offers virtually no
first amendment analysis.
A guiding principle in right of publicity actions involving
memorabilia appears to be that only if a commercial product
serves informative or cultural functions will it be deemed worthy
138. This leads the author to the unhappy conclusion that at this particular stage of his
career, Presley was worth more dead than alive.
139. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 102-13 and accompanying text.
142. 441 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Tenn. 1977), rev'd, 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 953 (1980).
143. Id. at 1324.
144. Id. at 1325.
145. Id. at 1330-31. Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit reversed on the ground that Presley's
right of publicity was not inheritable. 616 F.2d 956 at 960.
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of significant first amendment protection. Conversely, the unau-
thorized use of a person's attributes to create a product typically
will exceed the parameters of first amendment protection, and lia-
bility generally will result. In those situations, plaintiff's publicity
rights will properly prevail.
C. Appropriation of Plaintiff's Unique Style or Characteri-
zations
Unlike persons seeking the protection of patent and copyright
law, publicity right plaintiffs are not required, as a prerequisite to
recovery, to show that they have created anything tangible. That
which the publicity right seeks to protect-a person's persona or
individual style-would appear incapable of fixation in a tangible
medium of expression.
Frequently, "the elements of a person's public personality be-
come valuable only after the investment of considerable time, ef-
fort, skill and perhaps money."14 In recognition of this, courts
have construed the right of publicity to protect more than just
name and likeness. In proper circumstances, courts have found in-
fringement of the publicity right when defendants appropriated
plaintiff's characters or characterizations or imitated plaintiff's
personal style developed through years of hard work.147 As one
commentator observed, "The public interest . . . will support the
sporadic, occasional and good-faith imitation of a famous person to
achieve humor, to effect criticism or to season a particular episode,
but it does not give a privilege to appropriate another's valuable
attributes . . . as one's own without the consent, of the other. 148
Earlier, this Article examined two cases involving theatrical imi-
tations which graphically illustrate the tension between the right
of publicity and the first amendment guarantee of free speech.149
In Estate of Presley v. Russen, the court issued an injunction
prohibiting production of "The Big El Show," a stage production
146. Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 391-92, 400, 280 N.W.2d 129,
134-35, 138 (1979).
147. See supra notes 60-85 and accompanying text.
148. Netterville, Copyright and Tort Aspects of Parody, Mimicry and Humorous Com-
mentary, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 225, 254 (1962).
149. See supra notes 60-85 and accompanying text.
1988]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
patterned after an Elvis Presley concert featuring an Elvis imita-
tor.150 Similarly, in Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day &
Night Co., heirs of the Marx brothers obtained summary judgment
based on a right of publicity claim against producers of a play fea-
turing Marx brothers mimics. 151 In each case, plaintiffs argued that
they had inherited the publicity rights in question and therefore
had a right to prohibit the unauthorized imitations in the defend-
ant's performances.
Although both courts held that the defendants' failure to obtain
permission to perform the imitations violated plaintiffs' inherited
publicity rights, their rationales differed. In Russen, the theatrical
imitation's lack of creativity and information proved fatal to de-
fendant's assertion of the first amendment defense. 5 2 Conversely,
the imitative play in Groucho Marx Productions was characterized
as a misappropriation of the Marx brothers characters for commer-
cial purposes and consequently outside the scope of first amend-
ment protection. 153
Many popular figures have created distinctive characters that
have become recognizable through identifiable and concrete man-
nerisms, expressions, and even styles of dress. In Lombardo v.
Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., the court extended the right of
publicity to protect band leader Guy Lombardo against imitation
of his public performance.154 Defendants had attempted unsuccess-
fully to obtain the services of Guy Lombardo and his orchestra for
a television commercial designed to promote the sale of a new car.
150. 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1382 (D.N.J. 1981). See supra notes 60-73 and accompanying
text.
151. 523 F. Supp. 485, 486, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d
Cir. 1982). See supra notes 74-85 and accompanying text.
152. 513 F. Supp. at 1359.
153. 523 F. Supp. at 493-94. Had the defendant in either Russen or Groucho Marx Pro-
ductions succeeded in convincing the court that its work qualified as a legal parody, the first
amendment defense would have prevailed, irrespective of commercial motives.
Imitation is primarily an attempt to duplicate the characteristics of another,
either to delude the public or to compensate for an absence of creative effort.
Parody, on the other hand, makes use of another's attributes as part of a larger
presentation, in which a considerable amount of the content is provided by the
parodist. For this reason, imitation is generally actionable, while parody tends
to be protected.
Felcher & Rubin, supra note 9, at 1605 (footnotes omitted).
154. 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (mem.).
[Vol. 29:781
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CASES
Essentially, the theme of the commercial involved a band perform-
ing at a New Year's Eve party celebrating both the arrival of the
New Year and the sale of a special edition of a car model. Undeter-
red by Lombardo's refusal to appear in the commercial, defendants
produced and televised an advertisement that mimicked the ges-
tures, musical beat and choice of music that the public identified
with Lombardo. 155 Lombardo argued that the defendants' use of
his style of performance constituted breach of contract, invaded
his privacy, and diluted the value of his own endorsements. In
turn, the court held that defendants' conduct created a valid cause
of action and that the exploitation of the public personality devel-
oped by Lombardo could justify relief in the proper circum-
stances.
156
In two separate decisions, defendants were restrained from using
the names, likenesses, characters and characterizations of deceased
comedians Stan Laurel and Oliver Hardy. The first case, Price v.
Hal Roach Studios, Inc., involved a dispute over the names and
likenesses of Laurel and Hardy.157 Suit was brought by the comedi-
ans' widows, the sole beneficiaries of their husbands' estates, and
by an entrepreneur who had been granted the exclusive right to
use and merchandise in perpetuity the "names, likenesses, charac-
ters and characterizations of Laurel and Hardy. '15 8 Notwithstand-
ing plaintiff's exclusive license, defendants claimed to hold the
world-wide merchandising rights to the deceased comedians'
names and likenesses. Further, defendants alleged that plaintiffs'
interests were in the public domain and argued that "articles not
protected by federal law from [imitation] . . . are not otherwise
protectible" under the state right of publicity. 59 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York was
not persuaded, however, and entered a permanent injunction
against defendants' misuse of plaintiffs' property right. The court
also assessed actual damages against defendants for "appropriation
of Laurel and Hardy rights."'' 0
155. Id. at 622-23, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664-65.
156. Id. at 620-22, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 663-64.
157. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
158. Id. at 838.
159. Id. at 843-46.
160. Id. at 847.
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In a subsequent suit, the same plaintiffs sought to enjoin the
production and distribution of a television series entitled "Stan 'n
Ollie," in which two actors portrayed the deceased comedians.161
Invoking res judicata, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that Laurel and Hardy pos-
sessed a property right of publicity that had survived their deaths
and was validly inherited by and assigned to the plaintiffs. Accord-
ingly, the district court granted the injunction. 16 2 Quoting the lan-
guage of the injunction issued in Price, the court restrained the
defendants from using the Laurel and Hardy names, likenesses,
characters, and characterizations "(including, without limitation,
use of their photographs or other reproductions of their physical
likenesses, the impersonation of their physical likenesses or ap-
pearances, costumes and mannerisms, and/or the simulation of
their voices) for advertising or commercial purposes."" 3
The Laurel and Hardy decisions are consistent with an earlier
case in which a California District Court of Appeal enjoined the
unauthorized imitation of the distinctive character creation "Char-
lie Chaplin."" 4 The court emphasized the concreteness that plain-
tiff Chaplin's creative expression had given to the character. Be-
cause imitating Chaplin would deceive the public and work a fraud
on both the public and Chaplin, the court issued the injunction. 65
Not all publicity right plaintiffs alleging an infringement of their
unique style have been successful, however. In Sinatra v. Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Co., Nancy Sinatra sued an advertiser whose tele-
vision commercials used the music and revised the lyrics of a song
she had popularized, "These Boots Are Made For Walking." ' 6 Ap-
parently forgetting the substantial celebrity of her infamous father,
Sinatra alleged that she was best known by her connection with
the song. Specifically, she charged that the woman who appeared
in the commercials imitated her dress, mannerisms, and style of
161. Price v. Worldvision Enter., Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), afTd, 603
F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979).
162. Id. at 256-58.
163. Id. at 256 (quoting Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y.
1975)) (emphasis in original).
164. Chaplin v. Amador, 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P. 544 (1928).
165. Id. at 360-62, 269 P.2d at 545-46.
166. 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
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delivery, and that this imitation deceived the public into believing
that she had endorsed the product."6 7 Although the defendants ad-
mitted that they had imitated Sinatra's style of performance, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied recov-
ery, affirming the district court's conclusion that the public had
not been misled into thinking that Sinatra had participated in the
commercials. 16 8
D. Appropriation of Plaintiff's Performance
Earlier, this Article observed that the only right of publicity ac-
tion to date to reach the Supreme Court concerned the alleged ap-
propriation of an artist's performance.169 Zacchini v. Scripps-How-
ard Broadcasting Co. involved the broadcast during the evening
news of an entire human cannonball act. 70 The Court held that
the circus performer's right of publicity in his stunt was infringed
notwithstanding defendant's assertion of a first amendment privi-
lege. Obviously, defendant could have staged its own human can-
nonball act without infringing Zacchini's publicity right. However,
the first amendment did not give defendant the right to appropri-
ate Zacchini's "entire act." ' To hold otherwise, according to the
Court, would threaten Zacchini's livelihood by reducing his gate
revenues to the extent that the curiosity of potential audience
members was satisfied by the broadcast. 2
The Court's decision in Zacchini is entirely consistent with the
twin policies underlying the right of publicity. First, the Court rec-
ognized the value of promoting artistic endeavor when it noted
that "the protection provides an economic incentive for [Zacchini]
to make the investment required to produce a performance of in-
terest to the public."173 Second, the Court's unwillingness to allow
defendant to reap the benefits of Zacchini's efforts is evident from
its statement that "[n]o social purpose is served by having the de-
167. Id. at 712.
168. Id. at 713, 718.
169. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
170. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
171. Id. at 575-77.
172. Id. at 575-76.
173. Id. at 576.
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fendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have mar-
ket value and for which he would normally pay."1 4
Relative to countervailing first amendment rights, publicity
rights are most powerful when asserted in performance cases, but
this particular infringement is rare. A vast percentage of publicity
actions involve disputes centered around the exclusive control over
the performer's name and likeness, not the performer's act. More-
over, to the extent that a performance has been reduced to a tangi-
ble means of expression-for example, film or record-the sole
remedy for infringement is provided by the federal copyright
law.175
In sum, the unauthorized commercial use of a plaintiff's name or
likeness is exploitative by nature and consequently merits little, if
any, first amendment protection. Regardless of whether the partic-
ular appropriation is for endorsement purposes or to promote the
sale of memorabilia, informative and cultural values are likely to
be nonexistent. Conversely, when plaintiff alleges an infringement
of his unique style or characterization, defendant's appropriation
may have first amendment value if the defendant has added a cre-
ative component to the original work or performance. Parody,
spoof, and satire consistently have received the protection of the
first amendment.17 However, although imitation may be the most
sincere form of flattery, in its purest form it is almost certain to
lead to liability. Finally, appropriation of a performer's entire act,
if not already reduced to a tangible medium of expression, will cer-
tainly be actionable under Zacchini.
V. JUDIcIAL ANALYSIS AND ANALOGIES
The decisions examined thus far compel the conclusion that the
scope of the right of publicity presents a fertile topic for heated
debate and vigorous litigation. In short, it is a subject about which
reasonable people can, and frequently do, disagree. Ever since the
174. Id. (quoting Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326-331 (1966)).
175. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-510 (1982).
176. See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 413 F. Supp. 1339, 1359 (D.N.J. 1981); Netterville,
supra note 148.
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publicity right first received judicial recognition in 1953,11 courts
and commentators have struggled to resolve questions concerning
the transferability, inheritability, and duration of the publicity
right.178 Given stare decisis and the law's reverence for precedent,
it is not surprising that legal scholars have adopted analogies from
other areas of the law to sharpen their analyses.
In Haelan, the seminal publicity right decision, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit appeared to regard
as an arbitrary exercise in classification the plaintiff's attempt to
characterize the right of publicity as a property right.179 According
to Judge Frank, "[w]hether it be labelled a 'property' right is im-
material; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag 'property' simply
symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecuni-
ary worth."1 0
Contrary to Judge Frank's assertion, the particular analogy se-
lected is far from "immaterial" and frequently is outcome determi-
native. Perhaps this is best illustrated by Lugosi v. Universal Pic-
tures,181 a decision that generated four separate opinions, each
relying on a different analogy. In 1931, Bela Lugosi portrayed
Count Dracula in a motion picture produced by Universal Pictures.
As part of his employment contract, Lugosi granted Universal the
right to exploit "any and all of the artist's acts, poses, plays and
appearances of any and all kinds" in connection with the film and
"to use and give publicity to the artist's name and likeness, photo-
graphic or otherwise ...in connection with the advertising and
exploitation" of the film. 82 In 1960, four years after Lugosi's
death, Universal began to license the use of the Count Dracula
character as portrayed by Lugosi in the sale of various articles of
177. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text. Although War-
ren and Brandeis are credited with giving birth to the publicity right in 1890, its judicial
baptism did not occur until Haelan Laboratories, some 63 years later. See Warren & Bran-
deis, supra note 9.
178. See supra notes 60-85 and accompanying text.
179. 202 F.2d at 868.
180. Id.
181. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
182. 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 541, 542 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972), rev'd, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d
425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
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memorabilia.183 Lugosi's widow and surviving son brought suit
against Universal for the appropriation of Lugosi's likeness. In ad-
dition to injunctive relief, plaintiffs sought recovery of Universal's
profits on the ground that the studio exploited without authoriza-
tion a valuable property right belonging to Lugosi's estate.L84
The trial court found that although Lugosi authorized Universal
to publicize his appearance in connection with its promotion of the
film, Lugosi did not grant commercial merchandising rights to Uni-
versal. Independent of the common law right of privacy, the court
found that Lugosi had a protectable property interest in the com-
mercial use of his appearance as Count Dracula.8 5
The Supreme Court of California rejected the trial court's prop-
erty right characterization as immaterial and instead characterized
the right as a valuable right embraced by the law of privacy."8 6
Although the majority ultimately endorsed the choice of the pri-
vacy right analogy, a concurring and a dissenting opinion charac-
terized the right of publicity as an employer-owned product of em-
ployment'87 and a proprietary right similar to copyright, 8'
respectively. Each analogy suggested has different legal conse-
quences and these are examined briefly below.
A. Property Right
The trial court in Lugosi recognized that the right of publicity is
intended to protect the individual from the unauthorized appropri-
ation of the commercial value of his name or likeness. 8 Because
publicity right plaintiffs frequently allege an impairment of their
ability to sell the right to use their names or likenesses, a property
right analogy has a certain appeal. Two consequences necessarily
flow from the property right analogy. First, the publicity right, like
183. Id. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
184. 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 542.
185. Id. at 548-49, 551.
186. 25 Cal. 3d at 819, 603 P.2d at 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
187. Id. at 826-27, 603 P.2d at 433, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 331 (Mosk, J., concurring).
188. Id. at 849-51, 603 P.2d at 448-49, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 346-47 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
189. 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 548-49.
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other property rights, is assignable. 90 Second, like all other per-
sonal property, the right of publicity is descendible. 191
B. Privacy Right
The Supreme Court of California in Lugosi identified the public-
ity right as being a derivative of the privacy right. 9 The interest
protected therefore was perceived to be the individual's right to be
left alone. 93 This holding runs contrary to the position taken by
the court in Haelan Laboratories that the right of publicity is dis-
tinct from the right of privacy. 194 Under a privacy analogy, public-
ity right plaintiffs suffer in three ways. First, because public figures
and celebrities voluntarily expose themselves to public scrutiny,
they may be held to have waived whatever privacy interests they
might otherwise enjoy. Second, because the privacy right protects a
person's emotional or diginitary interests, it is a personal right and
cannot be transferred. A privacy analogy thus would appear to pre-
vent a celebrity from assigning his publicity rights during his life-
time. Finally, because privacy rights perish with their possessor, a
privacy rationale would not encompass the descendibility of pub-
licity rights.
C. Employer-Owned Product of Employment
Judge Mosk's concurring opinion in Lugosi suggested that Lu-
gosi enjoyed no rights whatsoever in his portrayal of Count
Dracula. Because Lugosi's portrayal of the character was pursuant
to a contract with Universal Studios, Judge Mosk believed that the
fruits of Lugosi's labor properly belonged to his employer."'
"Merely playing a role. . . creates no inheritable property right in
190. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953), was the first decision to recognize the right of publicity as
distinct from a nonassignable privacy right.
191. See, e.g., Acme Circus Operating Co., Inc. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir.
1985) (right of publicity survives death of individual); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F.
Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) (decedent's estate had standing to bring suit based on right of
publicity).
192. 25 Cal. 3d at 824, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
193. Id.
194. 202 F.2d at 868.
195. 25 Cal. 3d at 826, 603 P.2d at 433, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 331 (Mosk, J., concurring).
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an actor. . . ."I" Judge Mosk conceded, however, that an actor's
likeness as a fictional character might be protectable when that ac-
tor was also the character's creator.197 Under this rationale, charac-
ters created by the Marx brothers and Laurel and Hardy presuma-
bly would be protected.""
D. Proprietary Right Similar to Copyright
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Tobriner and Manuel,
Chief Justice Bird analogized to copyright law and concluded that
the publicity right is descendible. According to Chief Justice Bird,
"the right of publicity recognizes an interest in intangible property
similar in many respects to creations protected by copyright law,
[therefore] that body of law is instructive."199 Borrowing from the
Copyright Act of 1976,200 Bird would limit the duration of the pub-
licity right to the performer's life plus fifty years.20 ' Under the
copyright analogy, a compromise of conflicting interests is
achieved. Although the publicity rights eventually would fall into
the public domain, the heirs of the creator of these would have
their interests protected for a limited but definite period of time.
VI. THE COPYRIGHT ANALOGY AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Certain similarities between the policies underlying the right of
publicity and copyright suggest that copyright is the proper anal-
ogy for defining the scope of publicity rights. First, by permitting
individuals to benefit from their personal efforts, both provide in-
centive for creative endeavor. 02 Second, both the right of publicity
and copyright frequently involve a substantial possibility of con-
flict with the first amendment.0
196. Id. at 825, 603 P.2d at 432, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 825-26, 603 P.2d at 432, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
199. Id. at 847, 603 P.2d at 446, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 344 (citation omitted).
200. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-118 (1982).
201. 25 Cal. 3d at 847, 603 P.2d at 446, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
202. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (copyright power intended "to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts").
203. See generally Felcher & Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is
There Commercial Life After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125, 1129 (1980).
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In Zacchini, the Supreme Court explicitly emphasized the copy-
right analogy when it protected plaintiff's publicity rights from the
unauthorized appropriation of his performance. 0 4 According to the
Court, "the State's interest [in recognizing a right of publicity] is
closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing
on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his endeav-
ors." 20 5 Significantly, the Court quoted the following language from
a frequently cited copyright case: "The economic philosophy be-
hind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copy-
rights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the
talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' "208
Apparently, lurking beneath the surface in both publicity right and
copyright decisions is the notion that "protection exists primarily
not to benefit the artist, but rather to benefit the public by offering
artists economic incentives to create."2 The goal of encouraging
creative endeavor is especially compelling in cases involving per-
formance rights, like Zacchini,20 8 or theatrical imitations, like Rus-
sen and Groucho Marx Productions.09 However, the goal loses
much of its validity in commercial infringement cases involving ad-
vertisements or memorabilia. Even though a performer's name and
likeness can prove to be commercially valuable assets, the prospect
of fame and stardom has provided ample incentive for creative en-
deavor long before memorabilia became big business.
Copyright confers on an author a limited power of monopoly. In
essence, copyright protection allows an author to prevent illicit
uses of his work, thereby securing a financial return on his creative
investment. The inherent conflict between copyright law and the
first amendment is obvious. We live in a society that values the
free flow of information and ideas. Nonetheless, a grant of copy-
right by definition restricts this exchange. The Copyright Act210 at-
204. 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 576 (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
207. Note, Human Cannonballs and the First Amendment: Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 30 STAN. L. RE V. 1185, 1192 (1978) (footnote omitted).
208. See supra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
210. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-118 (1982).
1988]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
tempts to strike a balance between encouraging individual creative
endeavor and promoting public availability of creative works. The
framers of the Constitution recognized that granting authors con-
trol over their creations provides an incentive for continuing crea-
tivity. On the other hand, society can benefit from creative en-
deavor only to the extent the creations are made publicly available.
The Constitution therefore mandates that copyright protection
may exist only "for limited Times." '211 The Copyright Act obeys
this command by providing that the duration of copyright repre-
sents a compromise between encouraging new artistic expression
and providing public access to this expression.2 12
If copyright grants exclusive rights in creative works, the right of
publicity grants exclusive rights in personal attributes. Just as
copyright gives authors a monopoly in their creative expressions,
the right of publicity grants individuals a monopoly in their per-
sonae.21 3 As a creature of state law, however, the right of publicity
varies greatly in nature and scope from state to state. According to
one commentator:
In some states, the right is not recognized. In other states, the
right has been judicially created, while in still others the right is
of statutory origin. There is also no uniformity among the states
in terms of the durational limits accorded the right of publicity.
In some states, courts have determined that the right terminates
upon the death of the individual depicted. In other states, the
right is inheritable if the individual depicted exercised the right
during his lifetime. In some jurisdictions, the right is survivable
regardless of whether or not it was exercised.214
By utilizing the copyright analogy in right of publicity decisions,
courts can inject uniformity and predictability into an area of law
marred by inconsistent and often conflicting determinations among
sister states. Because copyright is of constitutional origin, judges
can draw upon an extremely well-developed body of copyright case
law to assist their resolution of publicity right issues. Moreover,
211. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
212. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
213. See generally Note, Copyright and the Right of Publicity: One Pea in Two Pods?, 71
GEo. L.J. 1567, 1572 (1983).
214. Id. at 1572-73 (footnotes omitted).
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because the policies underlying both the right of publicity and
copyright are similar, the copyright analogy is especially apt.
Finally, the copyright analogy furnishes two mechanisms that
can help minimize the conflict between the first amendment inter-
est in the free exchange of information and ideas and the right of
publicity interest in securing for an individual control over the use
of his personal attributes. First, by engrafting copyright's dura-
tional limitation onto the publicity right, a balance is struck be-
tween an individual's control over his persona and society's access
to information and ideas. During his lifetime, the creator of public-
ity rights would exercise complete and exclusive control over the
use of his personal attributes subject to his right to transfer his
publicity rights for valuable consideration or by gift. Following the
creator's death, his heirs or assignees would control the monopoly
for an additional fifty years, after which the rights would enter the
public domain.
The copyright analogy suggests a second mechanism for mini-
mizing first amendment conflicts. The copyright doctrine of fair
use permits infringements of otherwise protected works when nec-
essary to further "the greater public interest in the development of
art, science and industry. '215 An examination of the fair use doc-
trine counsels its application in modified form to right of publicity
actions.
A. Fair Use and the Right of Publicity
Fair use has been described as a judicially constructed "rule of
reason" designed to ameliorate the hardships imposed on future
authors by the exclusivity of copyright protection.21 6 In essence,
fair use establishes a privilege to use copyrighted material in a rea-
sonable manner without the copyright owner's consent.217 Accord-
ing to one commentator:
215. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
822 (1964).
216. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5678-79.
217. Note, Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises: Emasculating the Fair Use
Accommodation of Competing Copyright and First Amendment Interests, 79 Nw. U.L. REV.
587, 610 (1984).
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The fair use doctrine thus recognizes that the development of
the arts and sciences may best be achieved by allowing for the
free dissemination of certain information affecting areas of uni-
versal concern, such as history and biography. By providing a
limited privilege ... to use an author's work, fair use [accom-
modates] competing copyright and first amendment interests so
as to preserve a marketplace of ideas.218
Parody is a fertile field for fair use litigation. In Elsmere Music,
Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co.,2 19 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit described the relationship between
parody and the original as follows: "A parody is entitled . . . to
'conjure up' the original. Even more extensive use would still be
fair use, provided the parody builds upon the original, using the
original as a known element of modern culture and contributing
something new for humorous effect or commentary. ' 220 Under this
standard, an artist is allowed considerable leeway in building on
the original.221 Nonetheless, when parody moves beyond conjuring
up an original toward wholesale appropriation, liability ensues. For
example, in Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night
Co.,222 the district court identified as an unfair use the defendants'
attempt to duplicate as faithfully as possible the performances of
the Marx brothers. 23
Although fair use has existed as a defense to infringement since
1841, its elevation to statutory status is a relatively recent develop-
ment.224 Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides in perti-
nent part that "the fair use of a copyrighted work. . . for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . ., scholar-
ship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. '229 The stat-
ute directs the courts to consider four factors in determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use:
218. Id. at 611.
219. 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
220. Id. at 253 n.1.
221. See id.
222. 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir.
1982).
223. Id. at 493.
224. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
225. Id.
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1. the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes;
2. the nature of the copyrighted work;
3. the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.226
These four factors are nonexclusive and are offered merely as
guidelines.
As a practical matter, courts tend to employ a two-part analysis
when resolving fair use issues. First, they look at whether the de-
fendant's use of the protected work resulted in an identifiable eco-
nomic harm to the plaintiff. Relevant considerations include
whether the particular use is a viable substitute for the copyright
holder's actual or potential commercial exploitation of the original
and whether the challenged use is considered socially valuable.
Second, courts consider whether the defendant has appropriated
such a substantial portion of plaintiff's creation that the use is pre-
sumptively unfair. Under this prong, extensive and verbatim ap-
propriations are actionable even absent proof of an identifiable ec-
onomic harm to plaintiff.
Using section 107 of the Copyright Act as a model, a fair use
defense can be fashioned for application to right of publicity cases.
An analysis of each of the four fair use factors as modified follows.
1. The Purpose and Character of the Use
In applying this factor, courts should focus on the specific in-
fringement alleged.227 Where plaintiff's name or likeness has been
appropriated for endorsement purposes or to promote the sale of
memorabilia, there exists little potential for conflict with the first
amendment. With respect to unauthorized endorsements, the de-
ceptive nature of this practice effectively removes it from the mini-
mal sphere of protection presently afforded commercial speech.
Nonetheless, in some situations the unauthorized use of a name or
likeness in an advertisement may not be deceptive and might qual-
226. Id.
227. See supra notes 114-33 and accompanying text.
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ify as a fair use. For example, in Namath v. Sports Illustrated,
quarterback Joe Namath complained that his likeness had been
appropriated when an advertisement for Sports Illustrated dis-
played an issue with Namath's picture on the cover.22 s Because the
use of Namath's likeness was only incidental and raised no impli-
cation of endorsement, the court properly denied recovery.229
If defendant has written a book or produced a movie about the
plaintiff, use of the plaintiff's name or likeness in a nondeceptive
fashion as part of an advertisement for the book or movie likewise
would qualify as a fair use. This situation should be distinguished
from the mere exploitation of plaintiff's publicity value for adver-
tisement purposes, which the court struck down as unfair competi-
tion and an invasion of the right of publicity in Hogan v. A.S.
Barnes & Co.230
When plaintiff alleges an appropriation of his unique style or
characterizations, first amendment interests are more significant,
and courts should resort to the two-part analysis suggested above.
If the court determines that defendant's use is so substantial as to
be unreasonable or is causing plaintiff identifiable economic harm,
the use should be deemed unfair. When the alleged infringement
involves the appropriation of plaintiff's right of performance, the
use is presumptively unfair. Because such a use directly reduces
the market for plaintiff's work, it places a strong economic disin-
centive in the path of plaintiff's creative endeavor.
2. Nature of the Publicity Right Invaded
Application of this factor assumes that the nature or origin of
the publicity right invaded may determine the scope of protection
granted. For example, when the plaintiff is involved in politics and
public service, uses of his personal attributes that are connected to
his political status should be considered presumptively fair in light
of compelling first amendment considerations. This principle is
228. 48 A.D.2d 487, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 897, 352
N.E.2d 584, 386 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1976).
229. Id.
230. 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1957). See supra notes 122-25 and accompany-
ing text.
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best illustrated by Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., discussed
earlier.31
Under this analysis, plaintiff's portrayal of a fictional character
created by a third party presumably would merit less protection
than plaintiff's portrayal of a character developed by and associ-
ated with him. When plaintiff's persona is entirely of his own crea-
tion, his publicity rights deserve more protection under both the
preventing unjust enrichment and the promoting creative endeavor
rationales. The publicity rights of Laurel and Hardy and the Marx
brothers thus would occupy a position of priority relative to those
of Bela Lugosi.
Finally, to the extent that plaintiff's acquisition of fame is unre-
lated to his creative or intellectual efforts, his assertion of publicity
rights is undermined. In these instances, protecting plaintiff's pub-
licity rights would not serve to encourage creative endeavor. If
plaintiff's personal attributes become commercially valuable as a
result of his antisocial behavior, his ability to sue for infringement
of his publicity rights should be restricted. For example, one can
imagine no public benefit being served by allowing Gary Gilmore's
estate to sue to enjoin the sale of memorial T-shirts bearing his
likeness superimposed on a bullseye.
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Use
Simply stated, this factor requires an evaluation of the extent to
which the defendant has appropriated the personal attributes of
the plaintiff. Wholesale imitation and verbatim mimickry are to be
distinguished from parody, spoof, and satire. For example, the ap-
propriation of plaintiff's entire act without permission should be
actionable per se. Zacchini furnishes a clear example of this.2 32
"The Big El Show" likewise would trigger liability under this fac-
tor.233 Conversely, mere imitation of a person's speech, manner-
isms, or dress should not be actionable without proof of deception.
Under this rationale, the decisions in Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire
231. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 60-73 and accompanying text.
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and Rubber Co.2"4 and Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach3 5
would be upheld.
4. Effect of the Use on the Market for Plaintiff's Publicity
Rights
This factor contemplates an analysis of the impact of defend-
ant's use on the present or potential market for plaintiff's public-
ity rights. Plaintiff therefore should not be required to demon-
strate that he has established such a market via personal
exploitation during his lifetime. As the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit noted in Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Center for Social Change v. American Heritage Products, Inc., "a
person who avoids exploitation during life is entitled to have his
image protected against exploitation after death just as much if
not more than a person who exploited his image during life."23 6
The economic consequences of a publicity right infringement are
most severe when defendant appropriates plaintiff's entire act. As
the Supreme Court observed in Zacchini, defendant's broadcast of
Zacchini's human cannonball act "pose[d] a substantial threat to
the economic value of that performance. "237 However, this is not to
suggest that plaintiffs must demonstrate an actual threat to their
livelihood in order to defeat a finding of fair use. Given sufficient
popularity, certain plaintiffs should be able to demonstrate grave
financial harm from lower level infringements such as advertising
and merchandising appropriations. Plaintiffs should not be re-
quired to prove that they derive substantial revenues from author-
ized endorsements or sales of memorabilia. Proof of dilution of the
potential market for their publicity rights in these areas should be
sufficient.
VII. CONCLUSION
Analysis of first amendment issues in right of publicity actions is
sharpened by breaking the publicity right down into its four com-
234. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
236. 694 F.2d 674, 683 (11th Cir. 1983).
237. 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977).
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ponent infringements. The particular infringement alleged will dic-
tate the appropriate level of first amendment scrutiny.
Because the right of publicity is a creature of state law, its na-
ture and scope vary considerably from state to state. At present,
publicity right decisions suffer from a lack of uniformity and con-
sistency. By drawing on copyright principles, courts can inject a
measure of predictability into this area. In addition, the copyright
analogy ameliorates the inherent conflict between the first amend-
ment and the right of publicity. First, engrafting copyright's dura-
tional limitation onto the publicity right strikes a balance between
society's interest in access to information and ideas and the indi-
vidual's control over the use of his personal attributes. Second, ap-
plication of a modified fair use defense in right of publicity deci-
sions can help achieve a balance between first amendment free
speech interests and the policies underlying the right of publicity;
namely, promoting creative endeavor and preventing unjust
enrichment.
1988]
